UC San Diego Department of Sociology Working Paper

2016-1

Building Social Cohesion with Bricks and Mortar: The Environmental Determinants of Trust in New York City's Public Housing

Kevin Beck

Abstract

Public housing has long been characterized as an environment that breaks down social cohesion among residents and gives rise to a host of social ailments. However, recent studies find that public housing does not alienate residents from their neighbors but instead promotes cooperation and collective action. To reconcile these discrepancies in the literature, I test several hypotheses that might explain how the built environment mediates an important indicator of social cohesion: trust in one's neighbors. Relying on data from the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey I find that, on average, residents in public housing are less likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents living in privately owned housing. I also find evidence to suggest that living in public housing might not have the same effect on all residents; rather, public housing might foster trust among certain groups of longtime residents. These findings inform debates over current efforts to rebuild public housing through demolitions and mixed-income housing. I argue that policies attempting to engineer social cohesion through building design overestimate the capacity of the built environment to influence social outcomes.

Keywords: public housing, trust, social cohesion, environmental determinism, New York City

Suggested Citation: Beck, Kevin. 2016. "Building Social Cohesion With Bricks and Mortar: The Environmental Determinants of Trust in New York City's Public Housing." Working Paper 2016-1, UC San Diego Department of Sociology.

Scholars have studied social cohesion in public housing in terms of social support (Fleming et al. 1985; Keane 1991; Briggs 1998; Kleit 2001; Reingold et al. 2001; Briggs et al. 2010), social control (Jacobs 1961; Rainwater 1970; Yancey 1971; Newman 1972; Gillis 1974; Newman and Franck 1982), and tenant activism (Venkatesh 2000; Feldman and Stall 2004; Arena 2012; Howard 2014; Williams 2015). A central theoretical problem in this literature is the seemingly dual effect that public housing has on social cohesion. On one hand, there is evidence that public housing fosters alienation among residents (Moore 1969; Rainwater 1970; Yancey 1971; Newman 1972; McCarthy and Saegert 1978) as well as social isolation from the broader city (Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Kanaiaupuni 1993; Wacquant 2008). On the other hand, there is evidence that public housing fosters support networks and collective action among tenants (Venkatesh 2000; Feldman and Stall 2004; Arena 2012; Howard 2014; Williams 2015). In both of these accounts, the size, design, and quality of public housing are thought to be mediating factors in residents' ability to develop and enforce norms of interaction.

Although the ecological effects of public housing continue to be debated in academic circles, public housing policy has moved forward while relying heavily on determinist theories of the built environment. In 1992, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) initiated a program known as Homeownership for People Everywhere VI (HOPE VI), which provides funds to the country's housing authorities for razing public housing deemed unviable and for relocating displaced tenants to newly built mixed-income communities. HOPE VI mixed-income housing is built at smaller scales and with more amenities than traditional public housing; it uses designs informed by the tenets of new urbanism and defensible space, and mixes public housing units with units receiving shallower subsidies or no subsidies at all (Schwartz 2010). By reconfiguring the built environment, mixed-income housing is designed to cultivate

relationships between public housing residents and their wealthier neighbors, ultimately alleviating the social isolation long thought to plague traditional public housing (Joseph, Chaskin, Webber 2007). However, the latest evaluations of mixed-income housing find little evidence that any meaningful social integration has occurred (Chaskin et al. 2009; Kleit 2005; Kleit and Carnegie 2011; McCormick et al. 2012; Chaskin 2013). This outcome not only suggests that the environmental determinants of social cohesion remain poorly understood, but also that multi-billion dollar housing programs such as HOPE VI might be overinvesting in demolitions and new housing designs.

To address this issue, I develop and test four hypotheses describing how the size and quality of housing might influence social cohesion. To measure social cohesion I rely on reports of residents' trust in their neighbors. Trust is a uniquely important component of interaction because it facilitates exchange (Stack 1974; Coleman 1988), increases cooperation (Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000), and enhances social control (Jacobs 1961; Sampson et al. 1997). To evaluate the relationship between housing and trust, I fit logistic regressions to cross-sectional data from the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS). The 2002 wave of the NYCHVS provides data on residents' reported trust in their neighbors and on the condition of the city's housing stock. New York City is an ideal location for this analysis because it is home to more units of public housing than any other city in the country. As of 2015, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) maintains 177,666 units of public housing (NYCHA 2015). These units comprise 8.1% of the city's rental apartments, provide shelter to 4.8% of the city's population, and make the NYCHA one of the country's largest landlords (NYCHA 2015).

My analysis demonstrates that, on average, New York City's public housing residents are less likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents living in the city's privately owned

housing. However, I also find evidence to suggest that public housing fosters trust among longtime residents who report living in housing that is of poor physical quality; I provide an explanation as to why this might be the case in the sections that follow. I argue that the ecological effects of public housing have only a small impact on trust among neighbors, and that public housing policies attempting to manufacture social cohesion by revising housing designs rely too heavily on assumptions that the built environment determines social outcomes.

SOCIAL COHESION IN PUBLIC HOUSING

In the late 1930s, the first public housing complexes were built in the United States. In some places, public housing provided high-quality homes to white, working class, two-parent families aspiring to middle class status (Vale 2000). In others, public housing was primarily a tool for clearing African American slums (Hirsch 1983). In most cases, however, early public housing consisted of segregated low-rise apartment buildings intended to house middle class residents who had fallen on hard times (Freidman 1966). The effective purpose of public housing changed during the post-war period. Seeking to allay housing shortages and urban decay, Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949, which would facilitate white flight to suburbia, increase the pace of slum clearance, and authorize funding for 810,000 new units of public housing (von Hoffman 2000). In the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty forced public housing authorities to integrate tenant bodies and open their doors to the nation's poorest residents (Bloom 2008; Goetz 2013; Vale 2013). Public housing was effectively becoming a program targeted to low-income minority communities (Massey and Kanaiaupuni 1993). With an impoverished tenant body and a 25% cap on the rents tenants could be charged, most housing authorities lacked funding to maintain buildings and invest in structural repairs. By 1970,

scholars had taken note of the physical deterioration in large public housing complexes and the social disorganization that seemed to follow (Moore 1968; Yancey 1972; Rainwater 1966, 1970). Salient explanations of social disorganization suggested that dilapidated high-rises atomized residents, broke down social ties among neighbors, weakened informal social control, and provided opportunities for crime to flourish (Newman 1972; Gillis 1974; Newman and Franck 1982). Similar ecological arguments are used to explain crime in traditional public housing today, and to justify efforts to demolish public housing high-rises (Popkin et al. 2000).

Historians and ethnographers have challenged the social disorganization thesis by demonstrating that public housing residents have not acquiesced to the challenges presented by substandard, and sometimes unsafe, housing. Instead, residents have worked collectively to ameliorate insecurities posed by building malfunctions and gangs (Venkatesh 2000), demanded their housing authorities make structural improvements to their apartments (Williams 2015; Arena 2012), protected their homes when threatened by demolition (Howard 2014), and worked to restore dignity to public housing after decades of stereotyping rendered it a stigmatized place (Feldman and Stall 2004). Descriptions of tenant activism suggest that public housing does not alienate residents from their neighbors. To the contrary, living in poorly maintained housing might serve as an impetus for residents to cooperate with their neighbors in efforts to improve the quality of their homes.

Public housing's effect on social cohesion is unclear. To reconcile seemingly contradictory findings, I consider several pathways through which housing might mediate trust among neighbors. These pathways take into account three components of the built environment: physical disorder, building size, and building quality. Previous studies find that observed disorder and poor building quality instill fear in residents and limit interactions among neighbors

(Rainwater 1966, 1970; Yancey 1971). They also suggest that the size and design of public housing high-rises weakens social control (Newman 1972; Gillis 1974; Newman and Franck 1982). Although these studies would suggest that public housing inhibits trust, they lack comparisons to privately owned housing and therefore cannot determine whether it is the physical qualities of public housing or something else associated with public ownership that appears to be styming social cohesion. To improve on earlier work, I develop four hypotheses describing how building disorder, size, and quality might influence trust among neighbors, and I test these hypotheses while controlling for public and private ownership.

HYPOTHESES

First I consider the null hypothesis – that trust is actually the product of residential sorting or selection effects. If, for example, public housing authorities select tenants who are predisposed to distrust their neighbors, or conversely, if individuals who are predisposed to distrust their neighbors disproportionately apply to live in public housing, then patterns of distrust might not be shaped by building disorder, size, or quality. Trust might be primarily an endogenous phenomenon unaffected by housing.

The predisposition to trust is referred to as generalized trust, the belief that a stranger's word, promise, or statement is reliable (Rotter 1980). Generalized trust is not natural; it is learned from one's early childhood experiences and is fairly stable over time (Erikson 1963; Uslaner 2002). Individuals who grow up among others who are trusters and trustworthy learn to expect strangers they encounter to be trustworthy as well. In surveys of the U.S. population, the respondents who most often report being generalized trusters are white, highly educated, and older (Smith 1997; Putnam 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Uslaner 2002). Minorities are

less likely to be generalized trusters because they disproportionately experience economic inequalities and discrimination, and because they are more likely to have lived in neighborhoods with concentrated disadvantage (Smith 2010). Given that two of the strongest indicators of generalized trust are socioeconomic status and race, and that public housing in the United States is disproportionately occupied by low-income minorities (Schwartz 2010), we might expect residents living in public housing to report less trust in their neighbors than residents living in privately owned housing.

Trust in public housing might be low as a result of yet another selection effect. Apartments in public housing are only leased to renters, who, compared to homeowners, may have fewer vested interests in their neighborhoods and thus weaker connections to their local communities (Logan and Molotch 1987). Connections to the local community may be important for trust if, as Putnam (2000) and others suggest (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Stolle 1998), there is a feedback mechanism between trust and participation in civic associations. According to Putnam, those who are high trusters more frequently participate in civic organizations and in turn become more trusting through their participation. Because renters are more likely to be transient residents of a community and perhaps less engaged in local associational life, they might report less trust in their neighbors when compared to a broader population that includes homeowners.

Although previous studies might lead us to the conclusion that trust in public housing is low (Moore 1968; Yancey 1972; Rainwater 1966, 1970; Newman 1972; Gillis 1974; Newman and Franck 1982; Popkin et al. 2000), these studies fail to control for residential sorting. This oversight motivates the null hypothesis. *H_0: Compared to residency in privately owned housing, living in public housing does not make residents more or less likely to report trust in their neighbors.*

Psychological Effects of Housing Disorder

One's predisposition to trust strangers can be mediated through psychological mechanisms. In studies of neighborhood social cohesion, observed disorder and perceived disorder are found to break down norms and amplify mistrust (Ross et al. 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush 2002, 2005). Ross et al. (2001) explain that residents who live in neighborhoods where disorder is ubiquitous believe that interactions with strangers may be dangerous. Observable cues of disorder such as buildings in disrepair, graffiti, and vandalism signal that social control is weak and may induce fear of victimization and a sense of powerlessness. In this context, distrusting strangers serves as a defensive mechanism against subjective threats such as fear of crime. Although there is evidence that disorder operates at the neighborhood level to amplify mistrust, it is not yet clear whether disorder has a similar effect in a more immediate context such as the housing environment.

Past studies provide evidence that observed disorder is common in public housing and that residents respond to disorder by avoiding interactions with other residents. Observed disorder in public housing takes the form of poorly built housing structures and a lack of maintenance (e.g. Rainwater 1966; Yancey 1971; Newman 1972; Kotlowitz 1991; Popkin et al. 2000; Hunt 2009). For example, describing Chicago's public housing at the turn of the 21st century Popkin et al. (2000: 11) write:

> Because the exterior hallways of the high-rises are covered with metal grates, the buildings look like prisons. Many apartments (and some entire buildings) are boarded up because their major systems – plumbing, heating, electrical – have failed.

> The grounds and hallways are often filled with refuse and reek of human waste. The buildings are infested with vermin, including rats, mice, roaches, and even feral cats. Lights in interior hallways, elevators, and stairwells are vandalized regularly, leaving these areas dark twenty-four hours a day. The buildings' exteriors, halls, and stairwells are often covered with graffiti or, in the better maintained developments, the evidence of the janitors' attempts to paint over the mess.

Chicago is not the only city where observed disorder in public housing is common. Similar accounts of poorly maintained public housing structures are reported in most major cities such as St. Louis (Rainwater 1970; Yancey 1971), New York City (Newman 1972), and New Orleans (Arena 2012). These accounts suggest that observed disorder has been a structural problem throughout the nation's public housing system rather than an isolated issue.

If observed disorder increases fear and diminishes trust (Ross et al. 2001), then we might expect little interaction among public housing residents in places where signs of disorder are common. This is indeed what many qualitative studies of public housing from the 1960s and 1970s studies bring to light. For example, Rainwater (1966) describes reclusive behavior and widespread fear of interaction among residents living in St. Louis's Pruitt-Igoe public housing complex. Rainwater argues that residents find their apartments to be "havens" in an otherwise threatening environment. He posits that "non-human" threats including pests, poisons, fire, cold temperatures, plumbing problems, dangerous electrical wiring, and unprotected heights contribute to residents' decisions to avoid their building's common spaces (Rainwater 1966: 27). Similarly, Yancey (1971) finds that residents at Pruitt-Igoe fear encounters in the elevators and stairwells because they are damaged, dark, and smell of urine. And at "Blackmoor," a

pseudonym for a public housing complex not unlike Pruitt-Igoe, Moore (1969: 20) notes that landings and stairwells "are completely enclosed and frequently are without any artificial illumination – day or night. They provide optimal conditions for robbery, assault, and rape, and many such crimes have taken place there."

Reports linking observed disorder with residents' fear of interacting with others in their housing complex motivate the first hypothesis. *H_1: Residents living homes with comparatively high levels of observed disorder are less likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents living in homes with comparatively less observed disorder.*

Social-Psychological Effects of Housing Design

Scholars have described public housing as a stigmatized environment because of its large scale, modernist architecture, and in some places its physical isolation from other buildings in the cityscape (Newman 1972; Popkin et al. 2000; Wacquant 2008). They have further argued that social control among residents is weak because public housing complexes lack defensible spaces, thereby preventing residents from collectively establishing and enforcing social norms (Newman 1972; Gillis and Hagan 1982; Newman and Franck 1982). Defensible spaces are housing designs that increase residents' sense of territoriality over common areas such as corridors, lobbies, stairways, elevators, and the exterior grounds (Newman 1972). Such designs might include a small wall or fence that serves to symbolically separate public spaces from the semi-private spaces pertaining to a public housing complex. Defensible spaces further enhance social control by increasing residents' ability to monitor semi-private spaces. For example, short buildings with many windows allow residents to monitor the grounds surrounding their apartment and intervene

when they see trouble. Newman (1972) has argued that public housing high-rises are often built without defensible spaces resulting in weak social control and high crime rates.

Scholars have further suggested that social control is weak in high-rise public housing structures due to the high density of residents. An excess of residents is thought to make public housing exceedingly anonymous and therefore an environment where residents have difficultly developing shared expectations for behavior (Gillis 1974; McCarthy and Saegert 1978). Studies bolstering this hypothesis find that robberies are more common in high-rises than in low-rises (Newman 1972), and that high unit density is associated with juvenile delinquency (Gillis and Hagan 1982). Although weak social control and high rates of victimization might be reasons to believe that trust in public housing is low, what might have even greater bearing on trust is how living in high-rises affects subjective fears of victimization (Ross et al. 2001; Uslaner 2002). To this extent, scholars have found that large-scale public housing is associated with fear of crime (Newman and Franck 1982).

The evidence linking building size to weakened social control motivates the second and third hypotheses. *H_2: Compared to residents living in short buildings, residents living in tall buildings are less likely to report trust in their neighbors. H_3: Compared to residents living in buildings with few units, residents living in buildings with many units are less likely to report trust in their neighbors.*

Strategic Interaction in Public Housing

In contrast to studies that describe public housing as an alienating environment where one would expect trust to be weak, a more recent thread of scholarship suggests that public housing residents engage in reciprocal exchanges, build support networks, and develop tenant

organizations (Venkatesh 2000; Feldman and Stall 2004; Arena 2012; Howard 2014; Williams 2015). This body of literature provides evidence to suggest that trust might be exceptionally strong in public housing. In these accounts, the hypothetical mechanism increasing trust among residents is repeated interactions intended to achieve shared goals. In contrast to generalized trust – an individual's attitude towards strangers – repeated interactions build strategic trust or a knowledge-based trust that exists in relationships (Coleman 1988; Smith 2010). Strategic trust is the belief that a social tie will behave in a way congruent with one's interests in a given context (Harden 2002). Strategic trust can emerge over time from a succession of reciprocal exchanges (Blau 1964). In practice, a successful exchange of material, emotional, or informational assistance may lead to more exchanges that produce greater amounts of trust (Mauss 1950; Stack 1974). Trust built through repeated interactions may then be the basis for broader-based collective action (Blau 1964).

The lack of maintenance in public housing has often provided residents with an impetus to build support networks and tenant organizations (Venkatesh 2000; Feldman and Stall 2004; Arena 2012; Howard 2014; Williams 2015). Although it is not yet clear whether these responses to substandard building conditions build trust, what the literature on tenant activism demonstrates is that public housing residents have not been alienated from their neighbors in all places or at all times. To the contrary, residents have worked collectively to improve the quality of their homes. One way residents have done this is by jointly demanding resources from their public housing authorities. For example, in the 1960s, residents in Baltimore's Lafayette Courts and Douglas Homes formed the Resident Action Committee to demand "a 'seasoned manager' to deal with the problems of high-rise complexes like safety, elevator maintenance, and servicing families and children" (Williams 2015: 213). In the 1980s, residents in the St. Thomas

Development in New Orleans organized a sit-in at their housing authority to demand roofs that did not leak and floors without missing tiles (Arena 2012:13). In the 2000s, residents at San Francisco's Valencia Gardens established a tenant organization to lobby their housing authority for "a day care center, computers, and job training" (Howard 2014: 77).

In many cases, residents' demands for better quality homes have gone unheeded. In response, residents have collaborated to improve the quality of their housing by using the resources on hand. Their efforts have sought to improve both the functional qualities of their housing as well as the reputation or social meaning of their homes (Feldman and Stall 2004). For example, residents at the Robert Taylor Homes responded to the Chicago Housing Authority's inability to make structural improvements and guarantee tenants' safety by establishing conflict mediation programs, using courtyards to plan communal activities, painting murals and signs to rid their buildings from ascribed stigma, developing committees to regulate elevator use, and establishing clubs to divvy out janitorial and security duties (Venkatesh 2000, 33). At Chicago's Wentworth Gardens, residents were forced to contend with broken roofs, plumbing, and lighting as well as infestations of rats and cockroaches (Feldman and Stall 2004). Although residents at Wentworth Gardens lacked the means to fix these problems on their own, they worked collectively to improve their housing in other ways. For instance, they appropriated underutilized spaces to create a community center, for hosting residential activities, and a community store, where residents could buy goods that were not available within walking distance.

Scholars documenting tenant activism find that longtime residents are the most engaged residents in tenant-based activities. For instance, at Wentworth Gardens, older women who had lived in their homes for an average of over 30 years were the primary managers of the tenants' community center and community store (Feldman and Stall 2004). Longtime residents may be

more likely to participate in these sorts of activities because they have stronger attachments to their housing complex than newer cohorts of residents who have only lived in public housing during turbulent periods (Small 2004). This is the case in Wentworth Gardens where longtime residents remember when their homes were widely recognized as desirable places to live in Chicago. The longtime residents at Wentworth Gardens are motivated to rebuild this reputation through their collective efforts.

Because longtime residents in public housing often work with their neighbors to improve the quality of their homes, and because trust might be built through these collaborations, I propose a fourth hypothesis. *H_4: Residents living in public housing for long periods of time and who report problems with the quality of their housing are more likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents living public housing for shorter periods of time and who report fewer problems with the quality of their housing.*

DATA AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY

I use data on trust and housing from the 2002 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) to test my hypotheses. The U.S. Census Bureau has been conducting the NYCHVS every three years since 1965 in order to update rent control and rent stabilization policies in New York City. The NYCHVS is a representative survey of residents living in the city's five boroughs. The survey samples 18,000 housing units, provides demographic characteristics of New York City's population, and reports on the condition of the city's housing stock. The 2002 wave of this survey is unique because it includes data on respondents' reported trust in their neighbors. The survey asked respondents whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: "People in this neighborhood can be trusted"

(NYCHVS 2002). I use this question to construct a binary dependent variable where trust equals one.

[TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS]

Table 1 compares the socioeconomic characteristics of residents in public and private housing in New York City; observations are limited to heads of households (N=15,894). Over 90% of household heads in public housing are minorities. The median household income in privately owned housing is more than three times the median household income in public housing. Approximately 75% of households in public housing are headed by women compared to roughly 52% of households in private housing. Public housing residents' median level of educational attainment was a high school diploma, lower than other residents in New York City who, on average, had some college experience. Table 1 suggests that the average household head in public housing differs from the average household head in private housing along racial, class, and gendered lines.

I include several independent variables in my analysis to control for selection effects: gender, employment, education, race, household income, welfare receipt, children, marital status, homeownership, and years in current residence. Household income and years in residence are measured continuously, and educational attainment is an ordinal measurement. All other individual-level variables are dummy variables. I expect age, education, race, and homeownership to be statistically significant predictors of trust (Logan and Molotch 1987; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Smith 1997; Putnam 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Uslaner 2002; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Smith 2010).

At the neighborhood level, disorder has been shown to mediate trust (Ross et al. 2001). To control for perceived disorder I include an independent variable indicating respondents' rating of the condition of the structures in their neighborhoods as poor, fair, good, or excellent. To control for observed disorder I include an independent variable that indicates survey-interviewers' observations of boarded up windows on the same block as the unit being sampled. In addition to specific controls for neighborhood disorder, I include a fixed-effects control of neighborhoods measured as sub-boroughs. Sub-boroughs are the smallest geographic units for which a measure of neighborhoods can be constructed using the NYCHVS. The survey carves New York City into 55 sub-boroughs, similar to Chicago's community areas. Each sub-borough contains at least 100,000 residents.

The independent variables of interest signify qualities of respondents' housing. First, I include a dichotomous variable indicating residency in public housing. Second, I construct a measure of observed building disorder to determine if visible deficiencies in the housing environment amplify mistrust. Building disorder is a count of disrepair of windows, stairways, and floors observed by the survey-interviewer while approaching and entering the building containing the unit being sampled. I expect building disorder to be negatively associated with trust (Ross et al. 2001). Third, I rely on two independent variables to determine the relationship between building size and trust. Building size is measured as the number of stories in a respondent's building and number of units in a respondent's building; both variables are ordinal. I expect both measures of building size to be negatively associated with reports of trust in neighbors (Newman 1972; Gillis and Hagan 1982; Newman and Franck 1982). Fourth, I rely on interaction terms to evaluate the effect of building quality on trust among residents public

housing, and to assess how building quality might affect public housing residents differently according to the number of years they have lived in their current residence.

The measure of building quality is a count of reported problems in a respondent's home. The variable includes counts of observed building disorder (i.e. visible deficiencies in windows, stairs, and floors) and reports of three problems that are primarily experienced: reports of broken heating equipment, reports of rodent infestations (rats and mice), and reports of water leaking into respondents' homes. Broken heating equipment is measured as any breakdown of heating equipment lasting at least six hours during the winter prior to the survey. Respondents could report zero, one, two, three, or four or more instances of heating equipment breakdowns. Rodent infestations are measured dichotomously as any sighting of rats or mice, or signs of rats and mice (e.g. droppings), anytime in the three months preceding the survey. Water leaks are coded dichotomously as any instance of water leaking into a housing unit during the 12-month period prior to the survey. In sum, the measure of building quality includes both observed deficiencies and experienced problems; it is a count variable ranging from 0 to 13.

After estimating the association between building quality and trust for all residents in the NYCHVS, I then introduce two interaction terms to determine if the effect of building quality on trust is modified by residency in public housing and length of time respondents have lived in their current residence. The first interaction term compares the effect of building quality on trust in public versus private housing. The second interaction term considers whether the effect of building quality in public housing is modified by the years residents have lived in their current public housing complex. Based on the tenant activism literature (e.g. Venkatesh 2000; Feldman and Stall 2004; Arena 2012; Howard 2014; Williams 2015), and the literature on strategic trust

(Mauss 1950; Blau 1964; Stack 1974; Harden 2002; Smith 2010), I expect longtime residency in poor quality public housing to be positively associated with reports of trust in neighbors.

I use data in the NYCHVS to estimate logistic regressions of household heads' reported trust in their neighbors. The first model includes individual-level controls, the second model introduces controls for neighborhood effects, and the remaining models include independent variables of interest. The final model can be formally written as,

$$ln[Pr(Y_i=1)/Pr(Y_i=0)]=\beta_0+\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2+\beta_3X_3$$

where $Y_i=1$ if the i^{th} respondent reports trust in neighbors, $ln[Pr(Y_i=1)/Pr(Y_i=0)]$ is the logarithm of the odds that a respondent in the NYCHVS reports trust in neighbors, β_0 is an intercept, X_1 is a vector of individual-level controls, X_2 is a vector of neighborhood-level controls, and X_3 is a vector of housing-level covariates. After presenting the logistic regressions, I use the final model to estimate the magnitude of the effects of observed housing disorder, building size, and housing quality on reported trust in neighbors for residents living in New York City's public and private housing.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF TRUST

Table 2 presents the results from the logistic regressions. Model 1 shows the relationship between residents' socioeconomic characteristics and their trust in neighbors. Coefficients for gender, education, race/ethnicity, age, and income are statistically significant predictors of trust, as would be expected by the literature on generalized trust (Smith 1997; Uslaner 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Smith 2010). Respondents who are white, male, married, homeowners, and

who have children are more likely to report trust in their neighbors when compared to their respective reference categories. Respondents with comparatively higher household incomes and greater levels of educational attainment are also more likely to report trust in their neighbors. The coefficients for employment and years in current residence are not statistically different from zero, indicating that neither have a statistically meaningful effect on the probability of respondents reporting trust in their neighbors. In Model 2, I introduce neighborhood-level controls for perceived neighborhood disorder, observed neighborhood disorder, and a fixed-effects control for sub-boroughs. Both perceived disorder and observed disorder are statistically significant and negatively associated with trust. These results are consistent with the literature on neighborhood disorder (Ross et al. 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush 2002, 2005).

[TABLE 2: REGRESSIONS]

In Model 3, I introduce a covariate for residency in public housing. The coefficient is statistically significant and suggests that residents living in public housing are less likely to report trust in their neighbors when compared to residents living in privately owned housing. Because this coefficient is significant net of individual level controls, H_0 is not supported: selection effects do not account for variation in trust across public and private housing. The results in Model 3 also lend support to arguments in the literature suggesting that public housing residents are alienated from their neighbors (Moore 1969; Rainwater 1970; Yancey 1971; Popkin et al 2000). However, these results do not explain why trust is less common in publicly owned housing.

Perhaps the effect of public housing on trust can be explained by the psychological impact of observed building disorder. In Model 4, I introduce a covariate for building disorder, measured as observations of broken windows, stairs, and floors. The coefficient for building disorder is statistically significant and negatively associated with trust. This result provides support for H_1: residents who live in buildings with visible structural deficiencies are less likely to report trust in their neighbors than otherwise identical residents living in buildings without similar deficiencies. It is important to note that this result is not specific to public housing residents; building disorder is negatively associated with trust net of housing tenure. In Model 4, the coefficient for residency in public housing is significant and negatively signed, suggesting that building disorder cannot account for the effect of public housing on trust.

Perhaps public housing's effect on trust is the result of weakened social control and perceived fear of victimization that is thought to be common among residents living in large buildings (Newman 1972; McCarthy and Saegert 1978; Gillis and Hagan 1982; Newman and Franck 1982). In Model 5, I introduce two covariates to evaluate the effects of building height and units per building. The first measures the number of stories in a respondent's building and the second measures the number of units in a respondent's building. The coefficient for stories is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that H_2 is not supported: residents in taller buildings are no more or less likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents in comparatively shorter buildings. However, the coefficient for units per building is statistically significant and negatively assoicated with trust. This result lends support to H_3: residents living in buildings with many units are less likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents in buildings with comparatively fewer units. Model 5 suggests that, in terms of creating or maintaining trust among neighbors, it may matter less whether buildings are constructed

vertically or horizontally so long as they contain few units. The coefficient for residency in public housing is significant and negatively signed in Model 5, suggesting that building size cannot account for the effect of public housing on trust.

Although the results thus far suggest that residents who live in public housing are less likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents living in privately owned housing, the literature on tenant activism suggests that trust might vary among public housing residents according to the physical quality of their homes and the length of time they have lived in public housing (Venkatesh 2000; Feldman and Stall 2004; Arena 2012; Howard 2014; Williams 2015). I begin to evaluate this hypothesis in Model 6. Here I consider whether residents who report problems with the quality of their buildings are more or less likely to report trusting their neighbors when compared to residents who report fewer problems with the quality of their buildings. The coefficient representing reported problems in building quality is statistically significant and negatively associated with reports of trust.

In Model 7, I introduce an interaction term to determine if living in public housing modifies the effect of housing quality. The interaction term is negatively signed but not statistically different from zero, suggesting that residents who live in poor quality homes are no more or less likely to report trust in their neighbors if their homes are publicly or privately owned. In Model 8, I introduce a three-way interaction term to evaluate whether the effect poor building quality is modified by residency in public housing and the number of years that residents have lived in their current unit. The coefficient for this interaction term is statistically significant and positively associated with trust. This result provides evidence to support H_4: residents who have lived in public housing for many years and who live in buildings with many

problems are more likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents who have lived in public housing for comparatively fewer years and who live in buildings with fewer problems.

[TABLE 3. PREDICTED PROBABILITIES]

In Model 9, I introduce all housing-level covariates and interaction terms to evaluate whether the effect of residency in public housing can be explained by a combination of building disorder, size, and quality. In Model 9, the coefficient for building disorder is not statistically different from zero. This coefficient is likely insignificant because the measure of building quality includes all measures of building disorder. All other housing-level covariates are statistically significant and signed as they were in earlier models. The coefficient for residency in public housing is significant and negatively associated with trust net of all housing-level covariates. This result suggests that public housing has an effect on trust that is not reducible to the qualities of the built environment considered here.

In Table 3, I estimate the magnitude of the effects of building disorder, size, and quality on trust. I also consider the impact of public and private ownership. The percentages in Table 3 are the estimated probabilities that a hypothetical resident living in New York City reports trust in her neighbors. This hypothetical resident has the socioeconomic characteristics of an average household head living in the city's public housing: she is a black woman with a high school diploma, who is currently unemployed, and who does not receive public assistance. She is not married, does not have any children, and has lived in her apartment for 16 years.

I first estimate the likelihood of this resident reporting trust in her neighbors assuming she is living in a public housing complex that is 6-10 stories high, containing 50-99 units, and

with building disorder and quality held at their averages for public housing. Under these conditions, this resident has a 21.8% chance of reporting trust in her neighbors. However, if we reestimate this value assuming that she lives in public housing but with building conditions set at their averages for New York City's privately owned housing, that is, a 4-story building with 10-12 units, and building disorder and quality set at their averages for private housing, then her probability of reporting trust in her neighbors increases by 4.2 percentage points to 26%. Because this resident is more likely to trust her neighbors when living in a housing enviornment more closely approximating that of the average housing environment found in the city's privately owned housing, this result suggests that privately owned housing, on average, is more conducive to trust. It also suggests that if building disorder, size, and quality have an effect on trust that this effect is fairly small.

In the second comparison, I hold building disorder, size, and quality constant while comparing the effect of public versus private ownership. In this senario, if our hypothetical resident moves from publicly owned housing to privately owned housing her chance of reporting trust in her neighbors increases by 9.6 percentage points, from 21.8% to 31.4%. This result suggests that private ownership of housing is more conducive to trust among neighbors than public ownership. It also suggests that the average effects of building disorder, size, and quality on trust is comparatively smaller than the effect of public/private ownerhship.

CONCLUSION

After controlling for theoretically important qualities of individuals, neighborhoods, and buildings, I find that residents living in New York City's public housing are less likely to report trust in their neighbors than residents living in privately owned housing. However, trust in public

housing might not be uniformly low. Longtime public housing residents who live in poor quality buildings are more likely to report trusting their neighbors than residents who have lived in public housing for comparatively shorter times and in buildings of comparatively higher quality. This may be because longtime residents living in poor quality buildings collaborate with their neighbors to improve the functional and symbolic conditions of their homes; and that trust might be built through these collective endeavors. The findings suggest that public housing has an uneven impact on social cohesion.

If building disorder, size, and quality do not explain why residents in New York City's public housing report less trust in their neighbors than residents living in privately owned housing then what does? One possibility is that public housing management is detrimental to trust. Public housing authorities have been critiqued for lax tenant selection procedures that fail to weed out residents who might not make for trustworthy neighbors. However, I find this explanation unconvincing because tenant screening in New York City's public housing has remained far more rigorous than in other cities (Bloom 2008). Public housing authorities have been further critiqued for lacking the capacity to monitor the population living in the buildings under their care. NYCHA (2016) officially counts 403,917 residents named on a lease for one of its apartments, but the true number of people residing in the city's public housing is thought to be much higher. Overcrowding in public housing might increase residential anonymity and hinder residents' attempts to build shared norms of interaction (Gillis 1974; McCarthy and Saegert 1978). However, because 'doubling-up' is also common in privately owned housing, especially in expensive housing markets like New York City's, I find this explanation unsatisfying.

Rather than problems with management, a more compelling explanation for the finding that residents in public housing report comparatively less trust in their neighbors is that there are

ecological effects associated with public housing that are not captured in my analysis. Although I consider disorder in terms of the observable deficiencies in residents' buildings, the NYCHVS does not provide data necessary to measure all potential sources of disorder. For example, Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) argue that perceptions of disorder might be informed by cultural stereotypes of concentrated poverty in minority communities. The authors make the case that bias against racial minorities has a stronger association with perceptions of disorder than environmental factors. Quillian and Pager (2001; 2010) arrive at similar conclusions in their studies linking perceptions of crime and perceived risk of vicitmization to local racial composition. These studies would suggest that a principle problem with public housing is not that residents live in large buildings of relatively low quality, but that they live in racially segregated communities. This remains an important avenue for future research on social cohesion in traditional public housing and mixed-income communities.

Nonetheless, the findings in this article highlight what is lost and gained in HUD's efforts to phase out traditional public housing. Between 1993 and 2007, HOPE VI funded the demolition of 96,226 units of traditional public housing of which only 55% will be replaced with units receiving equivalent subsidies (Schwartz 2010: 145). Newly built units will be high-quality apartments located in small, mixed-income housing complexes that are well maintained, privately managed, and blend seamlessly into the surrounding neighborhood. These physical improvements are costly and make a one-to-one replacement of razed public housing prohibitively expensive. The tradeoff, then, is many low-quality units located in large complexes for fewer units of comparably superior quality and design. The assumption running through this tradeoff is that pre-modernist designs, more amenities, and integration with wealthier neighbors will reduce social isolation. However, the findings in this paper suggest that the physical

qualities of housing have only a small impact on social cohesion among neighbors. More importantly, they suggest that traditional public housing might have a strong effect on social cohesion that is not reducible to bricks and mortar. This is not to say that public housing policy should not strive to provide housing of the highest quality, but that shrinking the country's stock of deeply subsidized housing cannot be justified under the pretenses of alleviating social isolation.

REFERENCES

Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2002. "Who Trusts Others?" *Journal of Public Economics* 85:207-34.

Arena, John. 2012. *Driven from New Orleans: How Nonprofits Betray Public Housing and Promote Privatization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Blau, Peter M. 1964. *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. New York: Wiley.

Bloom, Nicholas D. 2008. *Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

Briggs, Xavier de Souza. 1998. "Moving Up versus Moving Out: Neighborhood Effects in Housing Mobility Patterns." *Housing Policy Debate* 8(1):195-234.

Brehm, John and Wndy Rahn. 1997. "Individual Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital" *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 888-1023.

Chaskin, Robert J. 2013. "Integration and Exclusion: Urban Poverty, Public Housing Reform, and the Dynamics of Neighborhood Restructuring" *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 647: 237-267.

Chaskin, Robert, Mark Joseph, Sara Voelker, and Brenda Copley. 2009. “Mixed-Income Development Study” *The University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration and Case Western Reserve University School of Applied Social Sciences.* Report.

Coleman, James S. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *The American Journal of Sociology* 94:95-120.

De Souza Briggs, Xavier, Susan J. Popkin, and John Goering. 2010. *Moving to Opportunity: The Story of an American Experiment to Fight Ghetto Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Erikson, Erik H. 1963. *Childhood and Society.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.

Feldman, Roberta M., and Susan Stall. 2004. *The Dignity of Resistance: Women Residents' Activism in Chicago Public Housing*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fleming, Raymond, Jerome Baum, and Jerome E. Singer. 1985. "Social Support and the Physical Environment." Pp. 327-45 in *Social Support and Health*, edited by Sheldon Cohen and Leonard S. Syme. Orlando: Academic Press.

Friedman, Lawrence M. 1966. “Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview.” *California Law Review* 54(2): 642-669.

Gillis, A. R. 1974. "Population Density and Social Pathology: The Case of Building Type, Social Allowance and Juvenile Delinquency." *Social Forces* 53:306-14.

Gillis, A. R., and John Hagan. 1982. "Density, Delinquency, and Design: Formal and Informal Control and the Built Environment." *Criminology* 19(4):514-29.

Harden, Russell. 2002. *Trust and Trustworthiness*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Howard, Amy L. 2014. *More Than Shelter: Activism and Community in San Francisco Public Housing*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hunt, Bradford D. 2009. *Blueprint for Disaster: The Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Jacobs, Jane. 1961. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Random House.

Keane, Carl. 1991. "Socioenvironmental Determinants of Community Formation." *Environment and Behavior* 23:27-46.

Kleit, Rachel G. 2001. "Neighborhood Relations in Suburban Scattered-Site and Clustered Public Housing." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 23(3-4):409-30.

Kleit, Rachel G. 2005. "HOPE VI New Communities: Neighborhood Relationships in Mixed-Income Housing" *Environment and Planning A* 37: 1413-1441.

Kleit, Rachel G., and Nicole B. Carnegie. 2011 "Integrated or Isolated? The Impact of Public Housing Redevelopment on Social Network Homophily." *Social Networks* 33: 152-165.

Kotlowitz, Alex. 1991. *There are no Children Here: The Story of Two Boys Growing up in the Other America*. New York: Doubleday.

Logan, John R., and Harvey Molotch. 1987. *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Marschall, Melissa J., and Stolle, Dietlind. 2004. "Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the Development of Generalized Trust." *Political Behavior* 26(2):125-153.

Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Massey, Douglas S., and Shawn M. Kanaiaupuni. 1993. "Public Housing and the Concentration of Poverty." *Social Science Quarterly* 74(1):109-22.

Mauss, Marcel. 1950. *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London: Routledge.

McCarthy, Dennis, and Susan Saegert. 1978. "Residential Density, Social Overload, and Social Withdrawal." *Human Ecology* 6(3):253-72.

McCormick, Naomi J., Mark L. Joseph, and Robert J. Chaskin. 2012. "The New Stigma of Relocated Public Housing Residents: Challenges to Social Identity in Mixed-Income Developments." *City and Community* 11(3): 285-308.

Moore, William Jr. 1969. *The Vertical Ghetto: Everyday Life in an Urban Project*. New York: Random House.

Newman, Oscar. 1972. *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design*. New York: Macmillan.

Newman, Oscar, and Karen Franck. 1982. "The Effect of Building Size on Personal Crime and Fear of Crime." *Population and Environment* 5(4):203-20.

New York City Housing Authority. 2015. "Facts about NYCHA." Online: http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/factsheet.pdf.

Popkin, Susan J., Victoria E. Gwiasada, Lynn M. Olson, Dennis P. Rosenbaum, and Larry Buron. 2000. *The Hidden War: Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

—. 2000. *Bowling Along: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Quillian, Lincoln and Devah Pager. 2001. "Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime." *American Journal of Sociology* 107(3): 717-67.

Quillian, Lincoln and Devah Pager. 2010. “Estimating Risk: Stereotype Amplification and the Perceived Risk of Criminal Victimization.” *Social Psychology Quarterly* 73(1): 79-104.

Rainwater, Lee. 1966. "Fear and the House as Haven in the Lower Class." *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 1966(32):23-30.

—. 1970. *Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Families in a Federal Slum*. Chicago: Aldine Transaction.

Reingold, David A., Gregg G. Van Ryzin, and Michelle Ronda. 2001. "Does Urban Public Housing Diminish the Social Capital and Labor Force Activity of Its Tenants." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 20(3): 485-504.

Ross, Catherine E., John Mirowsky, and Shana Pribesh. 2001. "Powerlessness and the Amplification of Threat: Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Mistrust." *American Sociological Review* 66(4):568-91.

Rotter, Julian B. 1980. "Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility." *American Psychologist* 35(1):1-7.

Sampson, Robert J., and Corina Graif. 2009. "Neighborhood Networks and Processes of Trust." Pp. 182-216 in *Whom Can We Trust? How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Sampson, Robert J., and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2004. “Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Construction of “Broken Windows.” *Social Psychology Quarterly* 67(4): 319-342.

Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." *Science* 277: 918-24.

Schwartz, Alex F. 2010. *Housing Policy in the United States: Second Edition*. New York: Routledge.

Small, Mario L. 2004. *Villa Victoria: The Transformation of Social Capital in a Boston Barrio*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Smith, Sandra S. 2010. "Race and Trust." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36:453-75.

Smith, Tom W. 1997. "Factors Relating to Misanthropy in Contemporary American Society." *Social Science Research* 26:170-96.

Stack, Carol. 1974. *All Our Kin*. New York: Basic Books.

Stolle, Dietlind. 1998. "Bowling Together. Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust in Voluntary Associations." *Political Psychology* 19: 497-526.

Stolle, Dietlind. 2008. "When Does Diversity Erode Trust: Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions" *Political Studies* 56: 57-75.

The U.S. Census Bureau. 2002. "New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey." Online.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2015. "HUD's Public Housing Program." Online: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2003. "Mixed-Income Housing and the HOME Program." Online: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Uslaner, Eric M. 2002. *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Venkatesh, Sudhir. 2000. *American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

von Hoffman, Alexander. 2000. "A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949" *Housing Policy Debate* 11(2): 299-326.

Wacquant, Loic. 2008. *Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality*. Malden: Polity Press.

Wallin, Denise, Michael H. Schill, and Glynis Daniels. 2002. "State of New York City's Housing and Neighborhoods." Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy School of Law and Wagner School of Public Service, New York University.

Williams, Rhonda Y. 2015. “Myth #10: Public Housing Tenants are Powerless.” In Bloom, Nicholas, Fritz Umbach, and Lawrence Vale (eds) *Public Housing Myths: Perception, Reality, and Social Policy*. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 206-222.

Wilson, William J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Yancey, William L. 1971. "Architecture, Interaction and Social Control: The Case of a Large-Scale Public Housing Project." *Environment and Behavior*:3-21.

Table 1. Summary Statistics

	Private Housing	Public Housing	All Housing
Percent			
Trusts Neighbors	72.4%	41.9%	70.5%
Female	51.9%	75.2%	53.2%
Employed	62.0%	35.8%	60.5%
Black	22.9%	49.0%	24.4%
Hispanic	22.0%	40.5%	23.1%
Asian	9.1%	2.6%	8.7%
Other	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%
Has Children	20.1%	26.8%	20.5%
Married	39.7%	15.6%	38.3%
Homeowner	33.6%	0.0%	31.7%
Public Assistance	1.9%	8.1%	2.3%
Median			
Educational Attainment	Some College	HS Diploma	Some College
Household Income	$40,000	$12,000	$37,800
Years in Residence	7	13	7
Mean/SD			
Age	48.11 (16.44)	52.09 (16.50)	48.34 (16.47)
Perceived Neighborhood Disorder	2.06 (0.75)	2.54 (0.75)	2.09 (0.76)
Observed Neighborhood Disorder	0.14 (0.34)	0.14 (0.34)	0.14 (0.34)
Building Disorder	0.14 (0.54)	0.05 (0.31)	0.13 (0.53)
Units in Building	5.78 (3.37)	8.83 (1.65)	5.95 (3.37)
Stories in Building	3.37 (1.98)	5.38 (1.23)	3.49 (2.00)
Building Quality Problems	0.88 (1.52)	1.08 (1.65)	0.89 (1.52)
Total Count			
Household Heads	14,983	911	15,894

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Units and stories are measured in ranges.

Table 2. Results from Logistic Regressions of Trust

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Female	-.237**	-.219**	-.207**	-.216**	-.120**	-.221**	-.220**	-.220**	-.208**
	(.046)	(.050)	(.050)	(.053)	(.050)	(.053)	(.053)	(.053)	(.053)
Employed	.061	.042	.035	-.004	.032	-.017	-.017	-.016	-.019
	(.053)	(.058)	(.058)	(.061)	(.058)	(.062)	(.062)	(.062)	(.062)
Education	.076**	.036**	.033*	.028*	.039**	.028*	.029*	.028*	.035*
	(.012)	(.013)	(.013)	(.014)	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
Black	-1.211**	-.571**	-.514**	-.502**	-.501**	-.466**	-.466**	-.470**	-.456**
	(.057)	(.078)	(.079)	(.083)	(.079)	(.084)	(.084)	(.084)	(.084)
Hispanic	-1.108**	-.607**	-.572**	-.582**	-.560**	-.558**	-.558**	-.559**	-.549**
	(.060)	(.073)	(.073)	(.077)	(.073)	(.078)	(.078)	(.078)	(.078)
Asian	-.378**	-.063	-.048	-.073	-.078	-.058	-.059	-.063	-.086
	(.087)	(.097)	(.097)	(.102)	(.097)	(.103)	(.103)	(.103)	(.103)
Other	-.933**	-.236	-.213	-.280	-.233	-.269	-.270	-.277	-.274
	(.246)	(.285)	(.285)	(.303)	(.287)	(.305)	(.305)	(.305)	(.307)
Age	.015**	.013**	.013**	.012**	.014**	.011**	.011**	.011**	.012**
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Log of Household Income	.146**	.068*	.054	.062	.045	.066*	.066*	.064	.056
	(.027)	(.030)	(.030)	(.032)	(.031)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)
Welfare Receipt	-.423**	-.320*	-.301*	-.299	-.302*	-.258	-.258	-.249	-.259
	(.134)	(.149)	(.149)	(.156)	(.150)	(.159)	(.159)	(.160)	(.160)
Children	-.181**	-.120	-.109	-.095	-.109	-.088	-.088	-.088	-.083
	(.057)	(.063)	(.063)	(.066)	(.063)	(.067)	(.067)	(.067)	(.067)
Married	.137**	.131*	.122*	.091	.106	.092	.091	.089	.074
	(.053)	(.058)	(.058)	(.061)	(.058)	(.062)	(.062)	(.062)	(.062)
Homeowner	.761**	.444**	.407**	.441**	.274**	.382**	.383**	.391**	.262**
	(.058)	(.065)	(.066)	(.070)	(.069)	(.071)	(.071)	(.071)	(.074)
Years in Current Residence	-.003	-.003	-.002	-.002	-.003	-.001	-.001	-.002	-.003

	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Perceived Neighborhood Disorder		-.962**	-.955**	-.955**	-.947**	-.898**	-.898**	-.898**	-.892**
		(.036)	(.036)	(.038)	(.036)	(.039)	(.039)	(.039)	(.039)
Observed Neighborhood Disorder		-.239**	-.266**	-.287**	-.308**	-.254**	-.253**	-.252**	-.298**
		(.069)	(.070)	(.074)	(.070)	(.075)	(.075)	(.075)	(.075)
Residency in Public Housing			-.532**	-.557**	-.418**	-.620**	-.596**	-.588**	-.466**
			(.096)	(.100)	(.099)	(.102)	(.117)	(.118)	(.121)
Building Disorder				-.089*					.088
				(.044)					(.052)
Stories in Building					.019				.012
					(.033)				(.035)
Units in Building					-.076**				-.073**
					(.019)				(.021)
Building Quality Problems						-.129**	-.127**	-.127**	-.138**
						(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.020)
Building Quality Problems X Residency in Public Housing							-.026	-.199	-.198
							(.064)	(.104)	(.104)
Building Quality Problems X Residency in Public Housing X Years in Current Residence								.009*	.010*
								(.004)	(.004)
Pseudo R2	.13	.23	.23	.24	.24	.24	.24	.24	.25
N observations	12,635	12,542	12,542	11,410	12,542	11,253	11,253	11,253	11,253

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

* p<.05, ** p<.01
All models except for Model 1 control for sub-boroughs.

Table 3. The Impact of Housing on Trust

	Residency in Public Housing	Residency in Private Housing	Differences Resulting from Housing Tenure
Average Qualities of Public Housing	21.8%	31.4%	9.6%
Average Qualities of Private Housing	26.0%	36.5%	10.5%
Differences Resulting from Building Quality	4.2%	5.1%	

Note: The predicted values in this table are calculated for the average household head in New York City's public housing who lives on a city block with average levels of perceived disorder and observed disorder. Housing qualities in this table refer to housing disorder, building size, and problems in the physical conditions of the respondent's home.